M.A.L. v. Kinsland, No. 07-1409 (6th Cir. Oct. 7, 2008)
The U.S. Court of Appeals for Sixth Circuit (KY, MI, OH, TN) has ruled that a Michigan school district’s time, place, and manner restrictions on distribution of student materials in school did not violate a student’s free speech rights because those restriction were reasonable. Michael Lucas, a student at Jefferson Middle School (JMS), engaged in several pro-life activities on campus, including the Third Annual Pro-Life Day of Silent Solidarity on Oct. 24, 2006. JMS officials prohibited Michael from distributing anti-abortion literature during the school day. Michael handed out several leaflets before his English teacher sent him to Principal Stephen Kinsland’s office. The principal informed Michael that he could not engage in activities related to his pro-life beliefs because they were not "age-appropriate" and were "disruptive" and because he had not obtained "prior approval." After Michael sued, the parties entered into a stipulated agreement allowing him to distribute literature during the lunch hour at a table and post flyers in the hallways and on student bulletin boards in connection with a pro-life event planned for Jan. 31, 2007. However, the parties were unable to reach an agreement allowing Michael to distribute materials in the hallways. Michael argued that while the school can place reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and manner of distribution of non-school sponsored literature, the district failed to demonstrate the likelihood that the hallway distribution would result in a material disruption, as Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), requires. He also contended that the restrictions were vague, overbroad, and unreasonable. The district insisted the policy’s content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions were reasonable. A Michigan federal district issued a permanent injunction preventing school officials from prohibiting students from distributing literature in the hallways between classes, finding that the officials had failed to demonstrate that such distribution would pose a risk of substantially disrupting school operations. The court also awarded nominal damages.
The Sixth Circuit reversed the lower court’s decision granting the injunction and nominal damages. The appeals court began its analysis emphasizing that the U.S. Supreme Court and a number of the U.S. Circuit Courts, including the Sixth Circuit, had made “it clear that school areas such as hallways constitute nonpublic forums.” No evidence indicated the school’s hallways had been opened for indiscriminate use by the public and, therefore, the hallways remained a nonpublic forum. As a result, it concluded the school district was justified in imposing time, place, and manner restrictions on hallway speech, provided such “restrictions are viewpoint neutral and reasonable in light of the school’s interest in the effectiveness of the forum’s intended purpose.” The appeals court stated: “there is no indication that Jefferson’s proposed time, place, and manner regulation of Michael’s speech is based on a desire to suppress Michael’s anti-abortion viewpoint.” It also found the school’s requirement that students obtain prior approval before distributing materials reasonable. In addition, it rejected Michael’s contention that the JMS’s distribution policy was overbroad. It found that the use of the word “inappropriate” in the policy was limited to restricting materials that contained speech that is unprotected and “speech that schools have authority to prohibit under the Supreme Court’s decision in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986).”
The Sixth Circuit then turned to Michael’s argument that this case is governed by the standard articulated in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), that requires that the speech in question be likely to cause a material and substantial disruption to school operations before officials can suppress such speech. While school officials in Tinker sought to suppress speech based on the speaker’s viewpoint, JMS officials “merely sought to regulate the time, place, and manner of Michael’s speech irrespective of its content or his viewpoint.” As a result, it concluded that while the higher constitutional standard established in Tinker is appropriate to those situations where school officials “seek to foreclose particular viewpoints,” the school district “certainly need not satisfy this demanding standard merely to impose a viewpoint neutral regulation of the manner of Michael’s speech to prevent hallway clutter and congestion.” Lastly, the appeals court pointed out that requiring the school district to satisfy the Tinker standard would lead to schools having “less discretion over the use of school facilities than is exercised by any other public entity over any other forum on public property.”
M.A.L. v. Kinsland, No. 07-1409 (6th Cir. Oct. 7, 2008)
[Editor’s Note: For background on the suit, including links to NSBA’s amicus brief filed in support of the school district and a summary of the district court’s opinion, see below.]
NSBA School Law pages on M.A.L. v. Kinsland