Frazier v. Alexandre, No. 05-81142 (S.D. Fla. May 31, 2006)
A federal district court in Florida has ruled that a 1942 state law requiring students to stand and recite the Pledge of Allegiance violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, even though the law allows students to opt out, because they can only do so with written parental permission and are still required to stand during the recitation. Cameron Frazier, a student at Boynton Beach High School, was removed from algebra class after he refused to follow his teacher's instructions to recite the Pledge or stand during recitation. When he did so, his teacher verbally castigated him and then called in other school officials, who informed Cameron that under state law and Palm Beach County School District (PBSD) policy he could only opt out of reciting the Pledge with written parental permission and would still have to stand. Cameron sued PBSD officials, the Florida Board of Education (FBOE), and the state Education Commissioner, alleging that these actions, the district's Pledge policy, and the state law on which the policy was based all violated his right under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to be free from compelled speech. Prior to the court's ruling, PBSD and the individual school defendants entered into a consent order agreeing that a ruling striking down the state law would amount to a ruling that the school district policy was unconstitutional and would subject PBSD to liability.
The court first rejected FBOE's argument that Cameron lacked standing to bring the suit because he had failed to obtained parental permission to opt out and was, therefore, attempting to assert a third party's rights: his parents'. The court rejected the assumption in this argument that the parental permission provision of the law was constitutional. Even assuming Cameron was asserting third party interests, the court found that he would have standing because the U.S. Supreme Court has relaxed the limitation on asserting third party rights in cases of freedom of expression, in order to avoid the chilling effect of speech restrictions on others. Under Supreme Court precedent, the court found, a plaintiff in a free expression case has standing to raise a third party's interests when that plaintiff has suffered an injury in fact, such as being subjected to verbal castigation, removal from class, and an order to stand during the Pledge. The court also rejected the state's contention that Cameron lacked standing because the statute requires "civilians," not students, to stand for the Pledge. The court concluded that the clear and ordinary meaning of "civilians" in the statute necessarily includes students. Lastly, it rejected the contention that the state is not subject to the challenge because it is not responsible for enforcing the Pledge statute. Florida law clearly charges FBOE with enforcement of "systemwide education goals and policies" and enforcing school districts' compliance with state law.
Turning to the free speech claim, the court noted that Cameron was not challenging the recitation or content of the Pledge but only his compelled participation. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled beginning with
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), that government cannot compel an individual to engage in speech that the individual objects to as a matter of conscience or personal belief, and the court listed federal case law upholding the right of students to remain seated and silent during the Pledge. It rejected the state's attempt to rely on
Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004), for the proposition that a child's participation in the Pledge is a function of the custodial parent or legal guardian's convictions, rather than the child's.
Newdow simply is a case in which the Supreme Court found that a noncustodial parent lacked legal standing to serve as his child's next friend, the court concluded. Although parents have a constitutional right to direct the upbringing and education of their child, this right "does not translate into a requirement that a parent must give prior approval of a child's exercise of First Amendment rights in a school setting."
Having found the statute unconstitutional, the court addressed what relief should be awarded. Based on the previously executed consent order between Cameron and PBSD, the court permanently enjoined PBSD from enforcing any policy, practice, or custom that requires students to obtain parental permission before opting out of reciting the Pledge or requires students to stand during recitation. The court also ordered PBSD to pay Cameron $32,500 in damages, attorneys' fees, and costs.
Frazier v. Alexandre, No. 05-81142 (S.D. Fla. May 31, 2006)
[Link to full opinion][
Editor's Note: For background on this and similar lawsuits, see the earlier Legal Clips
summary now posted on the NSBA School Law pages. The Orlando Sentinel
reports below that PBSD spokesman Nat Harrington points out that the school district had begun implementing its safeguards to protect the rights of students who choose not to recite the Pledge prior to the court's decision. "We're going to take a look at the ruling and get in compliance with the law," he says. Meanwhile, FBOE Cathy Schroeder spokeswoman indicates that the state board has not yet decided whether to appeal. Although the ruling applies only to PBSD, attorney James Green of the American Civil Liberties Union, who represents Cameron, cautions that other school districts in Florida ignore the ruling at the risk of liability for enforcing an unconstitutional statute. He is seeking a statewide injunction to bar enforcement of the law.]
[NSBA School Law pages on lawsuit]Orlando SentinelBy Scott Travis
[Link to full story]