September 06, 2008
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Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. Murphy, No. 05-18 (U.S. June 26, 2006)


The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled, 6-3, that the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) does not require school districts to reimburse parents who prevail in special education disputes for the costs of experts. After the parents of Joseph Murphy won a lawsuit over reimbursement for private school tuition from Arlington Central School District (NY), they sought payment of a $29,250 fee for an educational consultant. The district court granted their motion in part. The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that although the statutory language of IDEA does not specifically authorize awarding expert fees, to rely solely on the statutory text would lead to a result Congress did not intend. Specifically, the appeals court concluded that the IDEA's legislative history and a footnote in the Supreme Court’s opinion in West Virginia University Hospitals Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991), required it to "construe the IDEA as providing for the reimbursement of costs such as those incurred here by [the parents' consultant] in conducting the expert evaluation."
       Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, delivered the majority opinion overruling the Second Circuit. Justice Alito began his analysis with reference to the Spending Clause of the U.S. Constitution, under which Congress enacted IDEA. Citing Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 17 (1981), the Court noted that any conditions attached to a state’s acceptance of federal funds under IDEA must be set out "unambiguously" so that states and localities "voluntarily and knowingly" accept these conditions with the funding. The Court defined the issue here as being whether "IDEA furnishes clear notice regarding the liability at issue in this case." While IDEA provides for award of "reasonable attorneys’ fees as part of the costs," this provides no hint that accepting IDEA funds will obligate a state to reimburse prevailing parents for services rendered by experts, the Court concluded, let alone the "clear notice" the Spending Clause requires. "Costs" is a legal term of art that generally does not include expert fees, and the IDEA provision was "not meant to be an open-ended provision that makes States liable for all expense incurred by prevailing parents." Rather, it authorizes only those costs provided for under the general statute governing awarding of costs in federal court, which limits witness fees to travel reimbursement and $40 per diem.
       This interpretation perhaps finds its strongest support in other Supreme Court decisions, Justice Alito wrote. In Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437 (1987), the Court had held that federal court rules do not give district judges discretion to award whatever costs may seem appropriate. In West Virginia Univ. Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey, 499 U. S. 83 (1991), the Court had held that another fee shifting provision almost identical to that in IDEA did not empower a court to award expert fees to a prevailing party. The majority rejected the argument that allowing recovering of expert fees would further IDEA’s "overarching goal of ensuring all disabled children have access to a free appropriate education," finding instead that IDEA "obviously does not seek to promote these goals at the expense of all other considerations, including fiscal considerations." As for IDEA’s legislative history, the Court ruled that "where everything other than legislative history overwhelmingly suggests that expert fees may not be recovered, the legislative history is simply not enough."
       Justice Ginsburg’s concurring opinion parted ways with the majority only as to the "clear notice" requirement under the Spending Clause. She concluded that the majority erred in extracting this requirement out of the context in which it was applied in Pennhurst, which concerned "an unexpected condition for compliance—a new [programmatic] obligation for participating States." In contrast, she argued, the current case concerned "not the educational programs IDEA directs school districts to provide, but merely ‘the remedies available against a noncomplying [district].’" She added, "The ball, I conclude, is properly left in Congress’ court to provide, if it so elects, for consultant fees and testing expenses beyond those IDEA and its implementing regulations already authorize."
       Justice Souter filed a dissenting opinion, as did Justice Breyer, who was joined by Justices Stevens and Souter. Justice Breyer emphasized IDEA’s legislative history, concluding that "I can find no good reason for this Court to interpret the language of this statute as meaning the precise opposite of what Congress told us it intended." Experts are necessary and expensive in IDEA cases, he asserted, and the result of the decision would be "a far cry from the level playing field Congress envisioned." The Court’s Spending Clause decisions never have required textual clarity as to each and every detail of federal programs, he argued, and the constitutional relevance of any ambiguity is whether states really would have rejected the federal funds. He also found the Court’s result odd, given that IDEA actions begin in state due process hearings, where the federal statutory rules as to awarding "costs" do not apply. "Only by seeking [Congressional] purpose," he concluded, "can we avoid the substitution of judicial for legislative will."

Arlington Central School District Board of Education v. Murphy, No. 05-18 (U.S. June 26, 2006)
[Full opinion]

[Editor’s Note: NSBA filed an amicus brief in support of the school district’s position that IDEA does not authorize awards of expert fees. For background on the case, including links to the brief and a summary of the Second Circuit’s opinion, see the NSBA School Law pages starting at the first link below. BoardBuzz has additional information, as well as reactions to the ruling. Plaintiffs in the National Education Association’s and the State of Connecticut’s lawsuits over alleged unfunded mandates in the No Child Left Behind Act have raised this Spending Clause argument. Background on those suits, including briefs setting forth this argument, are available starting at the links below.]

[NSBA School Law pages on Arlington Central Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Murphy]
[BoardBuzz on Supreme Court ruling]
[NSBA School Law pages on NEA lawsuit over NCLB]
[NSBA School Law pages on Connecticut lawsuit over NCLB]