Skoros v. City of New York, No. 04-1229 (2d Cir. Feb. 3, 2006)
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has upheld the New York City Department of Education's (DOE) holiday display policy, which allows the display of the menorah to symbolize Chanukah and the star and crescent to symbolize Ramadan but does not allow display of a crèche, or nativity scene, to symbolize Christmas. The court ruled that the policy does not violate the U.S. Constitution's Establishment Clause, the Free Exercise Clause, or parents' constitutional right to control the religious upbringing and education of their children. However, the court emphasized that it was not ruling on the question of whether a public school ever could include a crèche in a display. The DOE policy, adopted in an attempt to avoid unconstitutionally appearing to endorse religion, restricts holiday displays to "secular" symbols, including Christmas trees, menorahs, and the star and crescent. The Catholic League protested the policy, arguing that religious symbols like a crèche may be displayed on public property without offending the Establishment Clause, provided they are displayed with secular symbols and disputing DOE's classification of the menorah and star and crescent as secular symbols. DOE responded that the U.S. Supreme Court precedents cited by the League are not applicable to a public school setting and that the Court has found that a menorah has both "both religious and secular dimensions," while a crèche "is solely a religious symbol."
Parent Andrea Skoros sued, alleging that the policy violates: (1) the Establishment Clause by promoting and endorsing Judaism and Islam while conveying a message of disapproval of Christianity; (2) the Free Exercise Clause by coercing her children "to accept the Jewish and Islamic religions and to renounce [their] Christian religion"; and (3) her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to control the upbringing and education of her children. The federal district court ruled in favor of DOE on all of these claims, and the Second Circuit affirmed.
Acknowledging with sympathy the difficulty public officials have in applying its own and the Supreme Court's divided precedents on the constitutionality of holiday displays on public property generally, the Second Circuit sought to apply those precedents to "a different and more difficult context: public elementary and secondary schools." Addressing the Establishment Clause claim, the court cautioned that the Clause does not require the total absence of religion from public life. Rather, DOE's policy must be consistent with the three-part test set forth in
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
Lemon's first prong requiring a government policy to have a secular purpose is not intended to favor the secular over the religious, the court noted, but to prevent government from abandoning neutrality in favor of a particular point of view in religious matters. The court found that DOE's policy not only celebrates the secular aspects of the holiday season but also serves the secular purpose of promoting understanding and tolerance for the cultural and religious diversity of the community. While the court determined that DOE had misread Supreme Court precedent in characterizing the menorah as a secular symbol, it was "not persuaded that this error exposes defendants' true purpose to be the promotion of Judaism or Islam in the City's public schools." The court concluded that an objective observer would view the policy as having a secular purpose and that the integration of the menorah and star and crescent in displays communicates a secular purpose. The decision to represent Christmas through secular symbols did not reflect hostility to Christianity. As for
Lemon's second prong concerning a policy's effect, the court found that a reasonable observer would not understand DOE's policy to endorse Judaism or Islam or "to communicate to children who practice either of those faiths that they are favored members of their school and civic communities, while communicating to Christian children or others that they are somehow inferior." Nor did DOE violate
Lemon's third prong by entangling government with religion, since the policy limited only government speech and did not cede government authority to a sectarian group or take sides in a religious dispute.
Regarding Ms. Skoros's claim that DOE's policy violated her children's right to the free exercise of their religion, the court concluded that "the record in this case fails to demonstrate that the purpose of the defendants' challenged actions was to impugn Skoros's children's religious beliefs or to restrict their religious practices." Referring back to its Establishment Clause analysis, the panel reiterated that the use of the menorah in the displays was not to promote Judaism but to teach students about diverse cultures and traditions through the common theme of celebration. Lastly, the court found that there was no evidence that DOE's policy infringed on parental rights. While schools may not design curricula that violate the Establishment or Free Exercise Clause, DOE had not done so, and the court noted that parents do not enjoy a "fundamental right" under the Constitution to dictate to schools precisely how to teach their individual children.
Skoros v. City of New York, No. 04-1229 (2d Cir. Feb. 3, 2006)
[Link to full opinion]