Ramirez v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 481 F.Supp.2d 209 (E.D.N.Y. March 30, 2007)
A U.S. district court in New York ruled in March that a teacher diagnosed with epilepsy, depression, high blood pressure, and arrhythmia, all of which contributed to his excessive absenteeism, was not "disabled" within the meaning of the federal Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and that, even if he were disabled, he was not a "qualified individual" under the act. Julio Ramirez sued the New York City Board of Education, alleging disability discrimination in violation of the ADA and the federal Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA). The court ruled that the FMLA claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Under the ADA, the court noted, an employee suing a covered employer must show that he or she (1) is "disabled" because he or she has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities, or has a record of such impairment, or is regarded as having such impairment; (2) is "otherwise qualified" because he or she could perform the essential functions of his job with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) was fired because of the disability. The court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court has cautioned courts against interpreting the term "disability" under the ADA too narrowly. In assessing whether a disability exists, courts decide case-by-case: "(1) whether plaintiff had an impairment; (2) whether the impairment affected a ‘major life activity’ within the meaning of the ADA; and (3) whether that major life activity was substantially limited by the impairment." To prove a substantial limitation on the major life activity of working, a plaintiff must show that he is "significantly restricted in the ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes as compared to the average person having comparable training, skills and abilities." Factors taken into consideration include: "(1) the nature and severity of the impairment; (2) the duration or expected duration of the impairment; and (3) the permanent or long-term impact, or the expected permanent or long-term impact of or resulting from the impairment."
Mr. Ramirez’s impairments did not substantially limit his life activity of working, the court held, observing that under the ADA if mitigating measures can correct an impairment, then the impairment does not constitute a disability. Mr. Ramirez had indicated medication "helped a lot" to alleviate his symptoms. The court rejected Mr. Ramirez’s alternative argument that even if he was not disabled under ADA, his employers regarded him as such. Although Mr. Ramirez’s employer may have had knowledge about his condition, under the ADA mere knowledge is insufficient to prove "either that the employer regarded the employer as disabled or that the perception caused the adverse employment action." Neither Mr. Ramirez’s direct supervisor nor his principal viewed him as substantially impaired in his ability to teach. Rather, they were concerned over his missed instructional days, 52 during 1999-2000 and 42 in 2000-2001. Even if Mr. Ramirez had been disabled under the ADA, the court concluded that nonetheless he was not "otherwise qualified." Although he was able to perform his duties within the classroom as a teacher, he was absent from the classroom for almost a third of the school year, and "in addition to possessing the skills necessary to perform the job in question, an employee must be willing and able to demonstrate those skills by coming to work on a regular basis."
Ramirez v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 481 F.Supp.2d 209 (E.D.N.Y. March 30, 2007)