August 28, 2008
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Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., No. 05-1074 (U.S. May 29, 2007)


The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that for purposes of calculating an employee’s 180-day time limit for bringing a Title VII claim, the employer’s initial unlawful decision to set the employee’s pay, rather than each subsequent issuance of a paycheck based on the earlier discrimination, counts as the "unlawful employment practice" that starts the clock running. Title VII prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, or national origin, as well as retaliation against those who avail themselves of this protection. Lilly Ledbetter worked for 19 years at Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company’s plant in Gadsden, Alabama. At the end of her career her salary, the product of a series of annual raise decisions which was ostensibly based on merit, was between 15% and 40% lower than her male counterparts. Ledbetter filed a complaint with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), alleging sex discrimination, and subsequently filed suit in federal court, which ruled in her favor. The U.S. Court of Appeals for Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that her current low pay did not justify reaching back to challenge pay decisions made years ago. Instead, the appeals court held that employees may only challenge pay decisions within the statute of limitations period. Finding that no jury could conclude that either of Ledbetter’s last two pay decisions was intentionally discriminatory, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed her claim.

The Supreme Court affirmed. Justice Alito’s opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, focused on discriminatory intent as the crucial element of any disparate treatment claim, distinguishing between past discriminatory acts (pay decisions) and the present effects of those acts (paychecks). The Court concluded that, "current effects alone cannot breathe life into prior, uncharged discrimination." Instead, it ruled that Ms. Ledbetter should have challenged the intentionally discriminatory pay decision within 180 days of the discriminatory pay decision itself. The Court found the case was controlled by its previous decision in United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U. S. 553 (1977), in which a flight attendant who had been dismissed on the basis of marital status but later rehired without being restored to her former seniority level had no claim against the airline because the unlawful practice occurred at the time she was discharged, rather than when her seniority was decided later under nondiscriminatory rules. The Court distinguished its decision in Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U. S. 385 (1986), which held that "[e]ach week’s paycheck that delivers less to a black than to a similarly situated white is a wrong actionable under Title VII," by cabining it to cases in which the pay structure itself is discriminatory—i.e., where the official pay guideline is that blacks are to be paid less than whites. Were the Court to adopt a contrary rule, it found, "a single discriminatory pay decision made 20 years ago [that] continued to affect an employee’s pay today" could give rise to a lawsuit, "even if the employee had full knowledge of all the circumstances relating to the 20-year-old decision at the time it was made."

Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, which was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, argued that pay discrimination cases are more akin to hostile environment claims, which build up over time, than they are to firings, denials of promotion, or other "discrete acts" that usually give rise to an immediate suit. The dissent stressed that pay decisions build on each other over time, that information about pay disparity may not often be readily available until several pay decisions have been made, and that the intent to discriminate is still there as long as an employer knowingly perpetuates past discrimination. Furthering the broad remedial purpose of Title VII outweighs any potential prejudice to employers that would be occasioned by restarting the statute of limitations while the result of the discrimination continues, the dissent concluded.

Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., No. 05-1074 (U.S. May 29, 2007)
[Full opinion]